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Abstract—In this work, we propose a novel framework for
privacy-preserving client-distributed machine learning. It is mo-
tivated by the desire to achieve differential privacy guarantees
in the local model of privacy in a way that satisfies all sys-
tems constraints using asynchronous client-server communication
and provides attractive model learning properties. We call it
“Draw and Discard” because it relies on random sampling of
models for load distribution (scalability), which also provides
additional server-side privacy protections and improved model
quality through averaging. We present the mechanics of client and
server components of “Draw and Discard” and demonstrate how
the framework can be applied to learning Generalized Linear
models. We then analyze the privacy guarantees provided by
our approach against several types of adversaries and showcase
experimental results that provide evidence for the framework’s
viability in practical deployments. We believe our framework is
the first deployed distributed machine learning approach that
operates in the local privacy model.
I. INTRODUCTION
In this work, we propose a Machine Learning (ML) frame-
work, unique in many ways, that touches on several different
aspects of practical deployment of locally differentially private
ML, all of which are equally important. These aspects include
feasibility, scalability, efficiency, spam protection, ease of
implementation, and, of course, privacy. Ideally, they all must
interplay together in a manner that enhances each other. From
that perspective, this work is as much a systems one, as it is
both privacy and machine learning focused.
Machine learning made our mobile devices “smart”. Appli-
cations span a wide range of seemingly indispensable features,
such as personalized app recommendations, next-word sugges-
tions, feed ranking, face and fingerprint recognition and many
others. The downside is that they often come at the expense of
privacy of the users who share their personal data with parties
providing these services. However, as we demonstrate in this
work, this does not necessarily need to be the case.
Historically, ML was developed with a server-centric view
of first collecting data in a central place and then training
models based on them. Logistic regression [10] and neural net-
works [45], introduced over half a century ago, follow a now-
familiar paradigm of reading training data from the local disk
and adjusting model weights until certain convergence criteria
are met. With the widespread use of mobile devices capable
of generating massive amounts of personal information backed
up by the convenience of cloud data storage and infrastructure,
the community adopted the server-centric world-view of ML
simply because it was convenient to do so. As the training data
grew in size and could no longer fit on a single machine or even
several machines, we ended up collecting data from millions of
devices on one network and sending it “sharded” for training
to another network of thousands of machines. In the past, this
duality of responsibilities could be justified by large disparities
in hardware capabilities between the two networks, but this line
is blurrier at the present time.
Sharing personal data that contributes to a global ML
model and benefits everyone on the network—in many cases,
the data collector the most– can be viewed as undesirable
by many privacy sensitive users, due to distrust in the data
collector or risks of subpoenas, data breaches and internal
threats [33], [34]. Following the deployment of RAPPOR [16],
there has been an increased interest in finding ways for users
to contribute data to improve services they receive, but to do
so in a provably private manner, even with respect to the
data collector itself [44]. This desire is often expressed by
companies [26], [51], presumably in part to minimize risks
and exposures.
To address the privacy-utility trade-off in improving prod-
ucts while preserving privacy of user data even from the data
collector itself, we propose a novel client-centric distributed
“Draw and Discard” machine learning framework (DDML).
It provides differential privacy guarantees in the local model
of privacy in a way that satisfies all systems constraints
using asynchronous client-server communication. We call it
“Draw and Discard” because it relies on randomly sampling
and discarding of models. Specifically, DDML maintains k
versions (or instances) of the machine learning model on a
server, from which an instance is randomly selected to be
updated by a client, and, subsequently, the updated instance
randomly replaces one of the k instances on a server. The
update is made in a differentially private manner with users’
private data stored locally on their mobile devices.
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We focus our analyses and experiments with DDML on the
Generalized Linear Models (GLM) [40], which include regular
linear and logistic regressions. GLMs provide widely-deployed
and effective solutions for many applications of non-media rich
data, such as event prediction and ranking. The convex nature
of GLMs makes them perfect candidates to explore client-side
machine learning without having to worry about convergence
issues of the more complex ML models. Extension of DDML
to Neural Networks and other models optimized through
iterative gradient updates is relatively straightforward.
We demonstrate through modeling, analyses, experiments
and practical deployment that DDML provides attractive pri-
vacy, model learning and systems properties (feasibility, scal-
ability, efficiency and spam protection). Specifically, it offers
1) Local differential privacy: Through carefully calibrated
noise in the model update step, the DDML design ensures
local differential privacy [13].
2) Privacy amplification against other adversaries: Further-
more, in DDML the full model update is performed on
a client and only the updated model rather than raw
gradients are sent to the server, which strengthens the
privacy guarantees provided by DDML against weaker but
realistic adversaries than the strongest possible adversary
operating in the local model.
3) Efficient model training: Due to the variance stabiliz-
ing property of DDML, its final model averaging and
relatively frequent model updating, DDML has superior
finite sample performance relative to alternative update
strategies.
4) Asynchronous training: continuous, lock-free and scalable
training without pausing the process for averaging and
updating on a server side.
5) Spam protection: having k different instances of the same
model allows to assess whether any incoming update is
fraudulent or not without knowledge of users’ private
data.
6) Limited server-side footprint: store relatively little data on
a server at any given time, since k is usually small.
These properties will become clearer as we define them
more precisely in the following sections.
We are not aware of any other, currently deployed dis-
tributed ML approaches, that operate in the local privacy model
and use an asynchronous communication protocol. Federated
Learning [36], which is adopted by Google and is perhaps the
closest alternative, relies on server-side gradient batching and
averaging.
DDML offers two major contributions. Fist, it performs
direct, noisy updates of model weights on clients, as opposed
to sending raw and exact gradients back to the server. This
change offers local differential privacy guarantees, and more
importantly, requires an attacker to know the pre-image of
the model (a model sent for an update to the client) that
was updated to make any inference about private user data.
Separation of the two critical pieces of knowledge, pre- and
post-update models necessary to make any inference, in time,
especially in a high-throughput environment with k instances
being continuously updated, poses significant practical chal-
lenges for an adversary observing a stream of updates on the
server side. We discuss this in detail in Section IV.
Second, its radically different server-side architecture with
the “Draw and Discard” update strategy provides a natural way
of deploying such a service in the cloud. Sharding and repli-
cation in the cloud [24] is necessary to avoid updating entities
or values too often, beyond their specified or recommended
number of times per second. Making too frequent writes to
a single piece of data, be it in datastore, memcache [23] or
elsewhere, results in what is known as “hotspotting” [21]. If
you find yourself in a situation where several keys become
“hot” (updated beyond their capacity), your service becomes
unstable and clearly cannot accept even more traffic (unscal-
able). Even worse, it often negatively effects services co-hosted
with yours in the cloud that you may not even own.
Beyond these two major considerations, DDML offers a
completely lock-free asynchronous, and thus, more efficient,
communication between the server and clients, which is an
absolute must if one is developing in a massively distributed
environment [11], as well as a straightforward distributed
way to prevent model spamming by malicious actors, without
sacrificing user privacy.
We have implemented DDML at a large tech company and
successfully trained many ML models. Our applications focus
on ranking items, from a few dozen to several thousands, as
well as security oriented services, such as predicting how likely
it is that a URL one receives from someone is phishy. Our
largest models contain ≈ 50, 000 weights in size and we find
k = 20 to be the right trade-off between efficiency and scale
to avoid the “hotspotting” issue. Currently, at peak times for
several different applications, we receive approximately 200
model updates per second.
The paper is organized as follows: Section II reviews
differential privacy and related work. Section III presents a
detailed overview of our framework and its features, including
the variance stabilizing property in Section III-D1. Section IV
introduces our modeling of possible adversaries and discusses
DDML’s privacy properties with respect to them. In Section V,
we present experimental evaluations of DDML’s performance
as compared to alternatives and in Section VI we describe
the performance of a real-world application deployed using
DDML. We conclude with a discussion of limitations, alterna-
tives and avenues for future work in Section VII.
II. RELATED WORK
Differential privacy (DP) [13] has become the de-facto
standard for privacy-preserving data analysis [15], [12], [17].
A randomized algorithm A is (, δ) differentially private if
for all databases D and D′ differing in one user’s data, the
following inequality is satisfied for all possible sets of outputs
Y ⊆ Range(A):
Pr[A(D) ∈ Y ] ≤ exp()Pr[A(D′) ∈ Y ] + δ
The parameter  is called the privacy loss or privacy budget
of the algorithm [41], and measures the increase in risk due to
choosing to participate in the DP data collection. The variant
of DP when δ = 0 is the strongest possible differential privacy
variant called pure differential privacy; whereas δ > 0 allows
differential privacy to fail with small probability and is called
approximate differential privacy.
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ML in the Trusted-Curator Model: Most prior work
for differentially private machine learning assumes a trusted-
curator model, where the data is first collected by the company
and only then a privacy-preserving computation is run on it
[1], [48], [42], [9]. The trusted-curator model is less than ideal
from the user privacy perspective, as it does not provide privacy
from the company collecting the data, and, in particular, leaves
user data fully vulnerable to security breaches, subpoenas and
malicious employees. Furthermore, even in the case of the
trusted curator model, differentially private deep learning that
achieves good utility with reasonable privacy parameters has
been an elusive goal [46], [38], [1]. For example, the work
of [1] performs well on NIST data but struggles utility-wise
on CIFAR for reasonable privacy parameters.
ML in the Local Model: The pioneering work of RAP-
POR [16] for industry deployment, has been followed by
several recent efforts to deploy DP in the local model, i.e.,
guarantee DP to the user before the data reaches the collector.
Privacy in the local model is more desirable from the user’s
perspective [26], [33], [44], [51], as in that case the user does
not have to trust the data collector or the data being subject to
internal or external threats to the data collector.
Since the focus on differentially private computations in the
local model is recent, most, if not all, efforts to date have been
limited to learning aggregate statistics, rather than trainng more
complex machine learning models [18], [2], [5], [4], [7]. There
are also numerous results on the so-called sample complexity
for the local model, showing that the number of data points
needed to achieve comparable accuracy is significantly higher
in the local model than in the trusted curator model [28].
DDML can be considered an extension of the existing
literature on locally private learning. In particular, it sup-
plements private histogram collection of RAPPOR [16] and
learning simple associations [18] by allowing estimation of
arbitrary conditional expectations. While RAPPOR allows to
estimate marginal and joint distributions of categorical vari-
ables, DDML provides a principled framework for estimating
conditional distributions in a privacy-preserving manner. For
example, one can estimate the average value of Y given p
features X1, . . . , Xp by fitting a regular linear model described
by
E(Y ) = b0 + b1 ∗X1 + . . .+ bp ∗Xp.
III. DRAW AND DISCARD MACHINE LEARNING
In this section, we present our “Draw and Discard” machine
learning framework characterized by its two major compo-
nents: client-side noise addition and “Draw and Discard” server
architecture. Together, these contribute to strong differential
privacy guarantees for client data while supporting efficient,
in terms of model training, client-server data consumption.
At the heart of DDML is the server-side idea of maintaining
and randomly updating one of the k model instances. This
architecture presents a number of interesting properties and
contributes to many aspects of the framework’s scalability,
privacy, and spam and abuse protections.
DDML is not a new ML framework per se. It is model-
agnostic and, in principle, works with any supervised ML
model, though details vary for the client-side update and noise
addition. The scope of this work is limited to Generalized
Linear Models (GLMs), and we focus specifically on logistic
regression to show an example of an ML model that is very
popular in practice. We give a brief overview of GLMs and
fully describe DDML client and server architectures next.
A. GLMs
In GLMs [40], the outcome or response variable Y is
assumed to be generated from a particular distribution in
the exponential family that includes normal (regular linear
model), binomial (logistic regression) and Poisson (Poisson
regression) distributions, among many others. Mathematically,
GLMs model the relationship between response Y and features
X1, . . . , Xp through a link function g, whose exact form
depends on the assumed distribution:
E(Y ) = g−1(b0 + b1 ∗X1 + . . .+ bp ∗Xp) (1)
To train GLM models on clients, we use Stochastic Gra-
dient Descent (SGD) for maximum likelihood estimation, as
discussed below.
B. DDML Client-Side Update
SGD is a widely used iterative procedure for minimizing
an objective function
Q(B) =
1
N
N∑
s=1
Qs(B), (2)
where B = {b1, . . . , bp} is the vector of weights to be
estimated and Qs is a functional component associated with the
sth observation. Traditional optimization techniques require
differentiating Q(B), which, in turn, requires access to all N
data points at once. SGD approximates the gradient ∆Q(B)
with ∆Qs(B), computed on a small batch of Nc observations
available on a single client
∆QNc(B) =
1
Nc
Nc∑
s=1
∆Qs(B). (3)
To provide local privacy by adding random Laplace noise, a
differentially-private SGD (DP-SGD) update step is performed
on a client using the Nc observations stored locally
Bt+1 = Bt − γ∆QNc(Bt) + L
(
0,
∆f

)
, (4)
where γ is a learning rate and L
(
0, ∆f
)
denotes the Laplace
distribution with mean 0 and scale ∆f . ∆f is called sensitivity
in the differential privacy literature and  is the privacy budget
[15].
For GLMs, assuming all features Xi are normalized to the
[0, 1] interval and the average gradients 1Nc
∑Nc
i (Yˆi − Yi)Xi
are clipped to [-1, 1] (indicated by ‖A‖[-1,1]), the differentially-
private update step becomes
Bt+1 = Bt − γ
∥∥∥ 1
N c
Nc∑
i=1
(Yˆi − Yi)Xi
∥∥∥
[-1,1]
+ L
(
0,
2γ

)
.
Here, Yˆ is the predicted value of Y given a feature vector X
and the model Bt. For logistic regression, if all features are
normalized to [0, 1], no gradient clipping is necessary.
DDML client-side architecture is shown in Algorithm 1.
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Algorithm 1 DDML Algorithm for GLMs (client side). Pa-
rameters:
Y - response value, Yˆ - predicted value.
X - feature vector, B - a set of model weights.
γ - learning rate,  - privacy budget.
L(µ, s) - Laplace distribution with mean µ and scale s.
Normalize response Y and features X to [0, 1]
If Nc > 0, request model Bt from the server
Compute clipped average gradient: ‖G‖[-1,1] =
‖ 1Nc
∑Nc
i=1(Yˆi − Yi)Xi‖[-1,1]
Update model: Bt+1 = Bt − γ‖G‖[-1,1] + L
(
0, 2γ
)
Return model Bt+1 to the server
Algorithm 2 DDML Algorithm (server side). Parameters:
k - the number of models, B - a set of model weights.
Initialize k models
for each requested model update t do
Pick a random model instance Bt
Send Bt to a client
Receive updated Bt+1 from a client
Replace a random instance of the k models with Bt+1
end for
Prediction: average k model instances
C. DDML Server-Side Draw and Discard
While maintaining the k model instances on a server (k
versions of the same model with slightly different weights), we
randomly “draw” one of the k instances, update it on a client
and put it back into the queue by “discarding” an instance
uniformly at random. With probability 1k , we will replace the
same instance, while with probability k−1k , we will replace a
different one.1
This seemingly simple scheme has significant practical
implications for performance, quality, privacy, and anti-spam,
which we discuss in Section III-D.
DDML server-side architecture is shown in Algorithm 2.
a) Model Initialization:: We initialize our k models
randomly from a normal distribution with means b00, . . . , b
0
p,
which are usually taken to be 0 in the absence of better starting
values and variance σ2k =
k
2σ
2, where σ2 is the variance of
the Laplace noise added on a client side.
Because of the variance-stabilizing property (to be dis-
cussed in detail in Section III-D1), σ2k will remain the same in
expectation even after a large number of updates. It is crucial
for our spam detection solution that this initialization happens
correctly and the right amount of initial noise is added to
calibrate the update step on a client with the variance of the
k instances on the server side.
b) Model Averaging:: We average weights from all
k instances for final predictions. Of course, depending on
application, another way for using k versions of the same
model could be preferred, such as averaging predicted values
from each instance, for example.
1This is only approximately correct, since in a high-throughput environment,
another client request could have updated the same model in the meantime.
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Fig. 1: Variance-stabilizing property of “Draw and Discard”.
The left panel shows k models having the same intra-model
variance around the average model (dark red line) over time.
This is in contrast to the right panel where they diverge (intra-
model variance increases over time).
D. Properties and Features of DDML
We now describe properties of DDML that distinguish it
from existing solutions and make it feasible and scalable for
practical deployments.
1) Variance-stabilizing Property of DDML: Having intro-
duced an additional source of variation due to having k model
instances, an intra-model variance, it is important to understand
its nature and magnitude, especially relative to the variance of
the noise added on the client through the Laplace mechanism.
It is also of interest to understand how it changes over time.
One of the remarkable properties of the “Draw and Discard”
algorithm with k > 1 is its variance-stabilizing property, shown
schematically in the first panel of Figure 1. We prove in
Theorem 1 that the expected intra-model variance of the k
instances is equal to k2σ
2 and remains unchanged after an
infinite number of updates when adding noise with mean 0
and variance σ2.
Theorem 1. Let there be k models where each weight
B1, . . . , Bi, . . . , Bp has a mean µi and variance k2σ
2
i with
i ∈ [1, p]. Selecting one model at random, adding noise with
mean 0 and variance σ2i to each Bi, and putting the model
back with replacement does not change the expected variance
of the weights (i.e., they remain distributed with variance k2σ
2
i ).
The intuition behind this theorem is that with probability
1
k , we replace the same model, which increases the variance
of the k instances. This increase, however, is exactly offset by
the decrease in variance due to the cases when we replace a
different model with probability of k−1k because original and
updated models are highly correlated.
Proof: We use the Law of Total Variance
V ar(Y ) = E(V ar(Y |X)) + V ar(E(Y |X)).
Replacing the same model as drawn occurs with probability
4
1
k and the variance after the update for each Bi is equal to
V ar(Bi|j → j) = 1
k
(
k
2
+ 1
)
σ2i +
k − 1
k
k
2
σ2i
=
(
1
2
+
1
k
+
k − 1
2
)
σ2i
=
(
k
2
+
1
k
)
σ2i .
Replacing a different model partitions the space into 2 and
(k − 2) models which makes V ar(E(Y |X)) non-zero. The
overall mean after the update becomes
µBi =
2µ1 + (k − 2)µ
k
,
where µ1 is the mean of the model selected and model replaced
and has a distribution with mean µ and variance k2σ
2
i .
Then V ar(Bi|j → j′)
=
2
k
1
2
σ2i +
k − 2
k
k
2
σ2i
+
2E[(µ1 − µBi)2] + (k − 2)E[(µ− µBi)2]
k − 1
=
1
k
σ2i +
k − 2
2
σ2i
+
2
k − 1
(k − 2
k
)2
E[(µ1 − µ)2]
+
k − 2
k − 1
(2
k
)2
E[(µ1 − µ)2]
=
1
k
σ2i +
k − 2
2
σ2i +
2
k − 1
(
k − 2
k
)2
k
2
σ2i
+
k − 2
k − 1
(
2
k
)2
k
2
σ2i
=
(
1
k
+
k − 2
2
+
(k − 2)2
k(k − 1) +
2(k − 2)
k(k − 1)
)
σ2i
=
2k − 2 + k(k − 2)(k − 1) + 2(k − 2)2 + 4k − 4
2k(k − 1) σ
2
i
=
k3 − k2 − 2
2k(k − 1) σ
2
i .
Note that the the variance component must be computed with
k − 1 and not k because of the finite nature of k in this case.
Putting it all together,
V ar(Bi) =
1
k
V ar(Bi|j → j) + k − 1
k
V ar(Bi|j → j′)
=
1
k
(
k
2
+
1
k
)
σ2i +
k − 1
k
k3 − k2 − 2
2k(k − 1) σ
2
i
=
(
1
2
+
1
k2
+
k3 − k2 − 2
2k2
)
σ2i
=
k
2
σ2i .
DDML, due to its “Draw and Discard” update strategy,
dissipates the additional intra-model variability through ran-
dom model discarding which is particularly important when
the model has converged and the contractive pull of the SGD
is either small or non-existent, at a time when we continue
training the model and adding the Laplace noise on the client.
2) Asynchronous Learning.: Maintaining k model in-
stances allows for a scalable, simple and asynchronous model,
updating with thousands of update requests per second. It is
trivial to implement, relies on its inherent randomness for load
distribution, and requires no locking mechanism that would
pause the learning process to aggregate or summarize results
at any given time.
3) Differential Privacy.: Due to random sampling of model
instances, the DDML server architecture uniquely contributes
to differential privacy guarantees as will be discussed in Sec-
tion IV. Specifically, by keeping only the last k models from
clients, discarding models at random, and avoiding server-side
data batching, the DDML fulfills the goal of keeping as little
data as possible on the server. Through a nuanced modeling of
possible adversaries (Section IV-A) and corresponding privacy
analyses, DDML is able not only to provide privacy guarantees
in the local model, but also improve these privacy guarantees
against weaker but realistic adversaries.
4) Ability to Prevent Spam without Sacrificing Privacy.:
The k instances are instrumental in spam and abuse prevention,
which is a real and ubiquitous pain point in all major client-
server deployments. Nothing prevents a client from sending
an arbitrary model back to the server. We could keep track
of which original instance was sent to each client; however,
this would negate the server-side privacy benefits and pose
implementation challenges due to asynchronicity. In DDML,
having k replicates of each weight bi allows us to compute
their means µ and standard deviations σ and assess whether
the updated model is consistent with these weight distributions
(testing whether the updated value is within [µ− tσ, µ+ tσ]),
removing the need to make trade-offs between privacy and
anti-abuse.
5) Improved Performance.: Lastly, averaging k models for
prediction naturally extends DDML into ensemble models,
which have been shown to perform well in practice. Cur-
rently, the best-performing models on the MNIST hand-written
digit classification are neural net committees2. In addition,
as demonstrated by our real-world example in Figure 2,
reasonable, practical k ∈ [20, 30] range outperforms server-
side batching of 1,000+ gradients. In fact, empirical results
show (see Figure 2) that equivalent performance in terms of
loss and accuracy is gained when k is equal to the square
root of the server batching size (this is due to having made an
approximately the same number of update steps after taking
model discarding into account). The intuition for this is quite
obvious: the convex nature of GLMs is more suitable for many
small step updates in approximate directions than a much
smaller number of steps in precise directions [35].
E. Parameter Tuning and Clipping
Choosing the right learning rate γ is critical for model
convergence. If chosen too small, the learning process proceeds
too slowly, while selecting a rate too large can lead to oscil-
lating jumps around the true minimum. We recommend trying
2http://yann.lecun.com/exdb/mnist/
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several values in parallel and evaluating model performance to
select the best one. In the future, we plan to explore adaptive
learning rate methods in which we systematically decrease γ
(and, therefore, add noise) as the model converges.
By clipping gradients to a [-1, 1] range, we ensure that the
sensitivity of our update is 2γ. In practice, the vast majority
of gradients, especially as the model becomes sufficiently
accurate, are much smaller in absolute terms and, thus, could
be clipped more aggressively. Clipping to a [-0.1, 0.1] range
would reduce sensitivity by a factor of 10 to γ/5.
IV. PRIVACY OF DDML
We now discuss differential privacy guarantees provided
by DDML. Our analyses are with respect to feature-level
differential privacy, as discussed in Section VII, but they can
be easily extended to model-level privacy by scaling up the
noise by the number of features or by adjusting the norm of
the gradient in Algorithm 1.
A. Adversary Modeling
The main innovation of our work with respect to privacy
analyses comes from more nuanced modeling of heterogeneous
adversaries, and the demonstration that the privacy guarantees
a client obtains against the strongest possible adversary oper-
ating in the local model of privacy are strengthened by DDML
against weaker but realistic adversaries.
Our work introduces and considers three kinds of adver-
saries, differing in the power of their capabilities:
I (Channel Listener): is able to observe the communica-
tion channel between the client and the server in real time and,
therefore, sees both the model instance sent to the client and
the updated model instance sent from the client to the server.
II (Internal Threat): is able to observe the models on
the server at a given point in time; i.e., this adversary can see
model instances 1 through k but lacks the knowledge of which
of the k instances was the pre-image for the latest model update
due to lack of visibility into the communication channel.
III (Opportunistic Threat): can observe a model instance
at a random time, but has no knowledge of what was the
state of the model weights over the last Tk updates, i.e., this
adversary can, for example, see models at regular time intervals
Tk which is much larger than 1. Clients themselves are such
threats as they periodically receive a model to update.
The first adversary is the most powerful, and the privacy
guarantees we provide against this adversary (Section IV-B)
correspond to the local model of privacy commonly considered
by the differential privacy community (Section II).
The second adversary is modeling ability to access the
k model instances from within the entity running DDML.
It is reasonable to assume that such an adversary may be
able to obtain several snapshots of the models, though it will
be technically infeasible and/or prohibitively costly to obtain
snapshots at the granularity that allows observation of k models
before and after every single update. In other words, this
adversary may see the models knowing that they have just been
updated with a particular client’s data, but the adversary would
not have any knowledge of which models was the source or
pre-image for the latest update. The privacy guarantee against
this adversary (Section IV-C) will be stronger than against the
Channel Listener.
The third type of adversary is the weakest and also the
most common. Occasional access to models allows attackers to
obtain a snapshot of k model instances (in a case of an internal
threat) or just a single model instance (in a case of a client who
receives a model for an update) after a reasonably large number
of updates Tk. Because Tk independent noise additions have
occurred in the meantime, each model instance has received
an expected T updates and therefore, T independent noise
additions after a particular user’s update. Every user benefits
from this additional noise to a different degree, depending
on the the order in which their data was ingested, and, in
expectation and with high probability, enjoys significantly
stronger differential privacy guarantees against this adversary
than those of the local model, as will be shown in Section IV-D.
The table below summarizes the privacy results of this
section:
Adversary I II III
Expected Privacy Guarantee  k−12k 
1
k
√
T

B. Privacy against Channel Listener (Adversary I)
DDML guarantees -differential privacy against adversary
I. The claim follows directly [15] from our choice of the
scale of Laplace noise in the client-side Algorithm 1 and the
observation that clipping the gradient in Algorithm 1 ensures
sensitivity of at most 2γ.
It is possible to replace the Laplace noise used in the client-
side Algorithm 1 with Gaussian. In that case, the variance of
the Gaussian noise would need to be calibrated according to
Lemma 1 from [30] or Theorem A.1 of [15].
C. Privacy against Internal Threat (Adversary II)
We now show that the DDML server-side design has
privacy amplification properties whenever one considers an
adversary of type II. We illustrate that by computing the ex-
pected privacy loss against adversary II, where the expectation
is taken over the random coin tosses of the DDML server-side
Algorithm 2 that chooses the model instances to serve and
replace.
Lemma 1. The expected privacy loss against adversary II is
k−1
k · 2 , where the expectation is taken over the random coin
tosses of the DDML server-side Algorithm 2 that chooses the
model instances to serve and replace.
Proof:
Recall the DDML algorithm and the adversary model.
Adversary II knows that either 1) the client’s update overwrote
the previous model, so the model instance prior to the update
is no longer among the k they can see, or 2) the client updated
an existing model that is still observable among the k, but the
adversary doesn’t know which one was updated. We will call
the model that was sent to the client the pre-image and the
resulting returned model B∗.
Because of the design of DDML, the first scenario oc-
curs with probability 1k and the second scenario occurs with
probability k−1k . Moreover, if we are in the first scenario (i.e.,
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the pre-image is no longer among the k models due to the
“discard” part of DDML), then the client has perfect privacy
against adversary II. Indeed, due to the nature of the update
step in GLM, B∗ provides equal support for any client input
when the pre-image is unknown. In other words, the privacy
loss in the first scenario, 1, is 0.
We now compute the privacy loss in the second scenario,
when the client updated an existing model that’s still observ-
able among the k, but the adversary doesn’t know which one
was updated. We first do the analysis for k = 2, and then
generalize it to any k.
In this case, the privacy loss 2 is defined as
exp(2) = max
B1,B2,a,a′
Pr[B1, B2|a]
Pr[B1, B2|a′] ,
where the probability is taken over the random choices of
Algorithms 1 and 2, B1, B2 are all possible outputs in the
range of Algorithm 1, and a and a′ are the private values of
the client (in DDML’s case, the clipped average gradients in
[−1, 1]).
Expanding to account for the uncertainty of adversary II
of whether B2 is the updated model and B1 – its pre-image,
or vice versa, we have
e2 = max
B1,B2,a,a′
0.5Pr[B1|a,B2 pre-image] + 0.5Pr[B2|a,B1 pre-image]
0.5Pr[B1|a′, B2 pre-image] + 0.5Pr[B2|a′, B1 pre-image] ,
with probabilities now being taken over the random choices of
the client-side Algorithm 1.
Plugging in for the noise introduced by Algorithm 1, we
have
e
2
= max
B1,B2,a,a′
Pr[B1 = B2 − γa + L(0, 2γ

)] + Pr[B2 = B1 − γa + L(0, 2γ

)]
Pr[B1 = B2 − γa′ + L(0, 2γ

)] + Pr[B2 = B1 − γa′ + L(0, 2γ

)]
= max
B1,B2,a,a′
Pr[L(0,
2γ

) = B1 − B2 + γa] + Pr[L(0, 2γ

) = B2 − B1 + γa]
Pr[L(0,
2γ

) = B1 − B2 + γa′] + Pr[L(0, 2γ

) = B2 − B1 + γa′]
.
By properties of Laplace noise,
e2 = max
B1,B2,a,a′
exp
(
− |B1−B2+γa|2γ

)
+ exp
(
− |B2−B1+γa|2γ

)
exp
(
− |B1−B2+γa′|2γ

)
+ exp
(
− |B2−B1+γa′|2γ

) .
Case analysis shows that the maximum is achieved when
B1 = B2 and a′ = −1, a = 0 or a′ = 1, a = 0. Thus,
e2 = 22 exp(− 2 ) or 2 = 0.5.
Therefore, the expected privacy loss for k = 2 is
0.51 + 0.52 = 0.25.
Given the result for k = 2, it can be shown that the
maximum for 2 in the case of k > 2 models is also achieved
when all of the model instances are equal, and the updates
differ by 1 in absolute value. Indeed,
exp (2)
= max
Bi,Bj,a,a′,i 6=j
∑
i,j,i6=j
exp(− |Bi−Bj+γa|2γ

)
+ exp
(
− |B
j−Bi+γa|
2γ

)
∑
i,j,i6=j
exp(− |Bi−Bj+γa′|2γ

)
+ exp
(
− |B
j−Bi+γa′|
2γ

)
≤ max
Bi,Bj,a,a′,i 6=j
max
i,j
exp
(
− |B
i−Bj+γa|
2γ

)
+ exp
(
− |B
j−Bi+γa|
2γ

)
exp
(
− |Bi−B
j+γa′|
2γ

)
+ exp
(
− |B
j−Bi+γa′|
2γ

)
≤ exp
( 
2
)
Hence, in the case of k models the overall expected privacy
loss is 1k 1 +
k−1
k 2 =
k−1
k · 2 , as desired.
Note that the largest privacy loss is achieved when all
model instances are identical, which is consistent with intu-
ition: when all model instances are identical, the privacy am-
plification against adversary II comes only from the “discard”
step of DDML; whereas when the model instances held by
the server are non-identical, there’s additional benefit from the
uncertainty introduced by the server-side model management
of Algorithm 2 against adversary II. Specifically, the adversary
does not know which model instance was the one returned
and which was the pre-image, providing additional privacy
amplification.
At first, the privacy amplification of 2kk−1 for adversary II
over adversary I, may seem insignificant. This is not the case
for two reasons: first, the constants in privacy loss matter,
since, by the definition of differential privacy, the privacy
risk incurred by an individual choosing to contribute their
data grows exponentially with the growth of the privacy loss
variable [41], [14]. Since differential privacy started to gain
traction in industry, there has been significant debate devoted
to establishing what is a reasonable privacy loss rate and to
optimizing the analyses and algorithms to reduce the privacy
loss needed [25], [49], [43].
Second, the privacy loss of Lemma 1 is very unlikely
to be realized in practice, as the scenario of all of the
model instances being identical is unlikely. Specifically, the
probability of how unlikely it is can be studied using the
variance stabilization Theorem 1. The argument would take
the form of: with high probability due to variance stabilization,
there are several model instances that are not identical and
therefore, can be both the pre-image candidates or the instances
returned by the client, interchangeably. The higher the number
of plausible pre-image candidates among the model instances,
the less certainty the adversary has about the update, and
therefore, the smaller the privacy loss. We plan to formalize
this intuition in future work.
D. Privacy against Opportunistic Threat (Adversary III)
Finally, we analyze the privacy guarantees DDML provides
against adversary III – the one that is able to inspect a random
model instance out of the k models after a user of interest to the
adversary has submitted their model instance and an expected
T updates to that model instance have occurred since. Note
that in practice, the adversary may have an estimate of T , but
not know it precisely, as it is difficult to measure how many
updates have occurred to a model instance in a distributed
system serving millions of clients such as DDML.
The privacy amplification against this adversary will come
from two sources – from the “discard” step, in that it con-
tributes to the possibility that the model the user contributed to
is discarded in the long-term and from the accumulation of the
noise, in that with each model update, additional random noise
is added to it, which contributes to further privacy protection
for the user whose update has occurred in preceding steps. The
analysis of the privacy amplification due to the “discard” step is
presented in Lemma 2; the analysis due to noise accumulation
– in Lemma 3.
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Specifically, we find that as T becomes sufficiently large,
with probability ≈ 1 − 1k , each particular contribution has
perfect privacy, and with probability 1k the privacy guarantee
is amplified by
√
T , resulting in the overall k
√
T expected pri-
vacy amplification against adversary III compared to adversary
I.
Lemma 2. DDML discards 1− 1k updates long-term.
Proof: Consider a Markov process on the states
0, 1, . . . , k, where each state represents the number of models
in which a particular update can be found. Denote by pi - the
probability to go from i to i−1 or i+1. In DDML, pi = (k−i)ik2 ,
for 1 ≤ i ≤ k − 1, and p0 = 0, pk = 1.
Let qi be the probability of eventually ending up at state 0
if you start in state i. By the set-up of DDML, for 1 < i < k−1
we have:
qi = piqi−1 + piqi+1 + (1− 2pi)q, or 2qi = qi−1 + qi+1.
We also know that q0 = 1, p0 = 0, qk = 0, pk = 0,
q1 = p1q0 + p1q2 + (1− 2p1)q1,
qk−1 = pk−1qk−2 + pk−1qk + (1− 2pk−1)qk−1
Summing equations for 1 ≤ i ≤ k − 1 we have
2q1 + · · ·+ 2qk−1 = q0 + q1 + 2(q2 + · · ·+ qk−2) + qk−1 + qk
Simplifying: q1 + qk−1 = q0 + qk or
q1 + qk−1 = 1 (5)
On the other hand,
qk−2 = 2qk−1,
qk−3 = 2qk−2 − qk−1 = 3qk−1
qk−4 = 2qk−3 − qk−2 = 4qk−1
qk−5 = 2qk−4 − qk−3 = 5qk−1
qk−6 = 2qk−5 − qk−4 = 6qk−1
· · ·
q1 = 2q2 − q3 = (k − 1)qk−1 (6)
Combining (5) and (6), we have (k − 1)qk−1 + qk−1 = 1
or qk−1 = 1k and q1 = 1− 1k . Since DDML is set-up that each
particular contribution is initially in state 1, this completes the
proof.
Lemma 3. With high probability, DDML guarantees a user
(T , δT )-differential privacy against adversary III, where
T =
√
2T
√
ln
(
1
2δT
)
and δT is an arbitrary small constant
(typically chosen as O(1/ number of users)). T is the number
of updates made to the model instance between when a user
submitted his instance update and when the adversary observes
the instances. The statement holds if T is sufficiently large.
Proof of Lemma 3: We rely on the result from concurrent
and independent work of [19] obtained in a different context
to analyze the privacy amplification in this case. Specifically,
their result states that for any contractive noisy process, privacy
amplification is no worse than that for the identity contraction,
which we analyze below.
The sum of T random variables drawn independently from
the Laplace distribution with mean 0 will tend toward a normal
distribution for sufficiently large T , by the Central Limit
Theorem. In DDML’s case with Laplace noise, the variance of
each random variable is 8γ
2
2 , therefore, if we assume that the
adversary observes the model instance after T updates to it, the
variance of the noise added will be T · 8γ22 . This corresponds
to Gaussian with scale σ = 2
√
2Tγ
 .
Lemma 1 from [30] states that for points in p-dimensional
space that differ by at most w in `2, addition of noise
drawn from Np(0, σ2T ), where σT ≥ w
√
2
(
ln
(
1
2δT
)
+T
)
T
and
δT <
1
2 ensures (T , δT ) differential privacy. We use the
result of Lemma 1 from [30], rather than the more commonly
referenced result from Theorem A.1 of [15], because the latter
result holds only for T ≤ 1, which is not the privacy loss
used in most practical applications.
We now ask the question: what approximate differential
privacy guarantee is achieved by DDML against adversary
III? To answer this, fix a desired level of δT and use the
approximation obtained from the Central Limit theorem to
solve for the T .
2
√
2Tγ

≥ w
√
2
(
ln
(
1
2δT
)
+ T
)
T
T · 8γ
2
2
≥ w2
2
(
ln
(
1
2δT
)
+ T
)
2T
T · 4γ
2
2
· 2T − w2T − w2 ln
(
1
2δT
)
≥ 0
Solving the quadratic inequality, we have:
D = w4 + 4T · 4γ
2
2
w2 ln
(
1
2δT
)
T ≥ w
2 +
√
D
2T · 4γ22
=
2w2
8γ2T
√
1 + 16T
γ2
2w2
ln
(
1
2δT
)
For large T , the additive term of 1 under the square root
is negligible, so we have:
T ≈ 
2w2
8γ2T
4
√
T
γ
w
√
ln
(
1
2δT
)
=
w
2γ
√
T
√
ln
(
1
2δT
)
In DDML, w =
√
2γ, therefore,
T ≈ √
2T
√
ln
(
1
2δT
)
Consider a choice of δT = 10−8. Then Lemma 3 states
that T ≈ 3√T . In other words, if DDML guarantees  pure
differential privacy in the local model against an adversary who
can observe the channel communication between the client
and the server, then it provides a ( 3√
T
, 10−8)-approximate
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differential privacy guarantee against the weaker adversary
who can observe the models after T updates, with high
probability. Although pure and approximate differential privacy
are not directly comparable, one interpretation of this result is
that the privacy loss guarantee against the more realistic and
more common adversary III improves inversely proportional
to the square root of the frequency with which that adversary
can observe the model instances or, equivalently, the speed
with which the adversary can ensure that he obtains the models
after he knows that the target user of interest has sent the server
an instance updated with their data. Even though the inverse
dependence of privacy loss against adversary III on
√
T is only
approximate (see [19] for a precise analysis), it is noteworthy,
as in practical applications it may allow choosing a higher
, and thus improve the utility and convergence speed of the
learning framework. Indeed, adversary I is extremely unlikely
and/or requires significant effort to implement; therefore, it
may be acceptable to have a higher privacy loss against
it, while simultaneously maintaining a sensible privacy loss
against the more realistic and less resource intensive adversary
III.
V. EXPERIMENTS AND RESULTS
We study performance of the DDML framework using
a multi-class logistic regression. We evaluate the impact of
different choices of k (the number of instances) and different
levels of desired privacy budget, , on both model loss (training
set) and accuracy (hold-out set). In addition, we compare
convergence properties of “Draw and Discard” with the server-
side batching approach. By server-side batching, we mean a
server model in which updates are streamed into a temporary
storage (on a server), accumulated, and then averaged out to
make a single model update.
We also evaluate DDML “Draw and Discard” strategy
relative to alternative update schemes, which include sampling
updates with probability 1k , always replacing the same instance
and averaging models before overwriting them.
Finally, we demonstrate the effectiveness of DDML on
training a small logistic regression with known weights in our
production, real-world, distributed environment with millions
of daily users.
A. Experiment Configurations
We conduct our study on MNIST digit recognition [31]
challenge and use multi-class logistic regression with Cross-
Entropy loss as our model across different DDML config-
urations. The MNIST dataset has a training set of 60,000
examples, and a test set of 10,000 examples. Each 28x28
image is serialized to a 784 vector that serves as features for
predicting 0-9 hand-written digits.
We set our learning rate γ = 0.001 for all experiments
and standardize all features to [0, 1]. We simulate “clients” by
randomly assigning Nc = 10 examples to each one, resulting
in 6,000 “clients”. We also make 20 passes over training data
for all configurations. Because the number of model updates
differs for different experiment configurations, we standardize
our experiments by looking at the sample size, i.e., the number
of data points ingested by the algorithm up to that point.
Results of our experiments are visualized in Figure 2. For
experiments where k > 1, we initialize them using normal
distribution with means 0 and variance k2σ
2, where σ2 is the
client-side noise variance. For cases when we do not add noise
on the client side, we initialize with  = 1 in the client-side
noise calculation.
Comparing ks: Because the number of model instances
k is so central to the DDML framework, its impact on model
performance must be carefully evaluated. When studying the
effect of k, we did not add any Laplace noise on the client
side to eliminate additional sources of entropy. Loss on a
training set for different ks from 0 to 100 are shown in
the first panel of Figure 2. Accuracy results on the test set
using the averaged model over the k instances is shown in
the first panel of the second row. The k = 1 configuration is
equivalent to a standard server-side model training (the darkest
blue line) and clearly has the best performance. As we add
more model instances, the number of updates to each model
instance decreases (it’s equal to M/k in expectation), and
averaging over k instances, though beneficial, is not sufficient
to make up for the difference. Of course, as M , the sample
size, goes to infinity, all configurations converge and have
equivalent performance metrics3. In practice, we have been
using k ∈ [20, 30] model instances, which is sufficient for
scalability and does not incur a large hit in terms of short- to
medium-term performance.
Server-side batching: A commonly used solution to server
scalability problems is to batch 1,000s or 10,000s of gradients
returned by clients on the server. In addition to being inferior
in terms of privacy because the batch size is usually orders
of magnitude larger than our k, we empirically demonstrate
that this approach is also inferior in terms of finite-sample
performance whenever server-side batch size Ns > k2. The
second column in Figure 2 compares k = 10 and k = 20 with
four batch sizes, Ns, of 10, 100, 1,000, 10,000. It’s remarkable
how overlapping k = 10 and Ns = 100 curves are (it holds
empirically for other k =
√
Ns combinations). Because the
learning process must pause to average out gradients, Ns
is usually much higher than k to accommodate the high-
throughput traffic, which can be easily handled with just
k = 20 model instances and no interruptions to the learning
process. There is an argument to be made here that one would
use a larger learning rate for the server-side batching strategy,
since the gradients are estimated more accurately and larger
updates would be warranted. However, it is outside of the scope
of this work to study the feasibility of this claim in very general
terms. If the learning rate γ is selected “optimally” for the
DDML strategy, it is hard to imagine that one could always
make it much larger without getting into oscillation problems.
Privacy parameter : For this set of experiments, we
fix k = 10 and vary the amount of noise added on the client.
Results are shown in the last column of Figure 2, with the blue
line indicating model performance without the noise (same as
k = 10 in the first panel). We observe that for  > log(16)
there is no substantial negative impact of providing client-side
privacy on the model’s performance, while smaller privacy
parameter choice values such as  = log(3) do have some
negative impact.
3We do not demonstrate this in practice. It follows from theoretical
optimization results on convex functions.
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Fig. 2: Performance of DDML for different k (1st column) and  (3rd column). We also compare server-side batching and k
model instances (2nd column). Learning rate is γ = 0.001.
B. Comparing to Alternative Server Architectures
“Draw and Discard“ architecture may be criticized for
being too wasteful with data in terms of permanently losing too
many updates due to its overwriting strategy. As is clear from
Lemma 2, DDML keeps only 1k model updates; however, in
exchange, as we will explain below, it receives scalability and
generous privacy benefits, which is ultimately the main reason
of going down the path of training in a distributed manner. It is,
however, critical to understand the reasons behind the short- to
medium-term drop in model performance relatively to server-
side training. As we demonstrate in the experiments below, it
does not come from “losing‘’ data, but from partitioning the
training data into k groups, ultimately resulting in Mk updates
to each of them.
We compared the DDML server-side architecture (“Draw
and Discard”) to several alternatives. Here, we use k = 20,
γ = 0.001 and no Laplace noise to make comparisons easier
to interpret and comparable to Figure 2. First, in terms of data
utilization rate, DDML with random replacement of instances
should be approximately equivalent to accepting 1 in k model
updates (“ 1k Update Accept Rate”), i.e., if k = 20, we would
reject 19 model updates and accept 1, on average. We confirm
in Figure 3 that, indeed, this is the case (green and pink lines
essentially overlap and have very similar accuracy rates on the
MNIST dataset).
It is very interesting to note that the strategy of sampling
a model instance at random and always overwriting exactly
the same one after an update (“Same Instance Replace”) is
essentially equivalent to both the “Draw and Discard” and
“ 1k Update Accept Rate” strategies as can be seen in Figure
3. In this case, we do not discard any model updates, yet
the short-term performance does not improve. The reason for
that is that all k model instances received Mk updates in
expectation, and ultimately arrived to similar locations in terms
of objective function optimization. Averaging helps to stabilize
the estimates, but cannot possibly move the system closer to
the global minimum.
We also tried the averaging strategy where before over-
writing the model, we averaged weights between the updated
model and the model that is about to be overwritten. In a
completely sequential update case, this results in decreased
performance for both “Draw and Discard” and “Same Instance
Replace” as can be seen in Figure 3. This surprising result can
be easily explained by the fact that by taking an average, we
effectively decrease the learning rate (in the case of “Same
Instance Replace” strategy, we make it exactly half) which
results in inferior performance if the learning rate was not too
large in the first place.
Given that the current “Draw and Discard” strategy per-
forms as well or better as any other strategy considered,
the relevant considerations when deciding which to choose
are privacy, ease of implementation, latency, and robustness
to spam and abuse. We observe that, against attacker II,
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Fig. 3: The proposed DDML update strategy “Draw and
Discard” performs as well or better in terms of accuracy than
several alternative update strategies we considered. In this case,
we use k = 20 and learning rate γ = 0.001. In particular, it is
interesting to note that it is essentially equivalent to replacing
the same instance after an update and superior to averaging
strategies.
DDML offers a factor of 2 kk−1 privacy amplification to all
users, whereas “ 1k Update Accept Rate” offers perfect privacy
to (1 − 1k )-fraction of updates and no privacy amplification
for 1k fraction of updates; thereby, arguably making DDML
superior. DDML is trivial to implement in a distributed cloud
architecture such as Google Cloud Platform. A one-model
approach is much harder to implement and maintain, as one
has to deal with locking, situations when the client does not
return a model, etc. Having multiple versions of the same
model allows for private spam and abuse detection without
the need to know the pre-image.
We ran the above strategies for a whole range of k’s and
also decreased the learning rate by a factor of 10 compared
to simulations in Figure 2. Results are shown in Figure
4. We would like to make two observations. First, relative
performance of different strategies remains similar regardless
of k. Second, decreasing the learning rate results in substan-
tially worse performance for the “Draw and Discard” strategy
relative to the server-side one, especially as k becomes larger.
In fact, we are observing that learning rate has a larger effect
on performance than the number of model instances k. Given
how hard it is to select an appropriate learning rate in practice,
especially in a distributed system, and situations when the
choice is off by a factor of 10 from the optimal one not
uncommon, any loss of efficiency due to having k instances
could be insignificant in comparison.
C. Logistic Regression With Known Weights Trained On Dis-
tributed Devices
We have trained a simple logistic regression with 33
weights using DDML on a fully functional DDML framework
in our production environment with millions of daily users.
The model consists of 5 distinct predictors B (boolean), E1
(categorical: 3 categories), E2 (categorical: 4 categories), D
(double) and I (integer) and all possible two-way crosses
between them. The exact model specification is shown below.
logit(P (O)) = 0.34− 1.18B + 1.05E11 + 1.6E12
− 1.51E21 + 0.72E22 + 1.36E23
− 1.41D − 1.67I
− 1.14BE11 + 1.3BE12
+ 1.72BE21 + 0.18BE22 − 1.52BE23
+ 1.72BD − 1.17BI
− 0.12E11E21 − 0.53E11E22 + 1.00E11E23
− 0.42E12E21 − 1.64E12E22 − 1.53E12E23
+ 0.64DE11 + 0.48DE12
− 0.17IE11 + 0.44IE12
− 0.51BE21 − 0.68BE22 + 1.65BE23
+ 0.51IE21 − 1.64IE22 + 0.57IE23
− 0.80DI
Given our selection of parameters and features, the true
probability of outcome (O) for this model is about 46%. On
a client side, we store six fields in a local SQL database.
The model specification, in terms of which features to use
and which crosses to include, is controlled completely by
the server, which allows to train different models using the
same underlying data without making client-side changes. An
example of several rows of data for this model is shown in the
table below.
O B E1 E2 D I
1 1 ”A” ”c” 2.18 3
0 1 ”B” ”a” 0.89 4
1 0 ”C” ”b” 0.23 0
1 0 ”C” ”d” 1.30 1
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
DDML parameters for this model are k = 30 and learning
rate γ = 0.005. We did not add noise to the update step in
this case to eliminate an additional source of uncertainty, as
this was the first model we trained using the framework. Up
to this point, we have received 983,068,969 model updates
and estimated weights along with the true ones are plotted in
Figure 5. Estimates are very close to the true parameter values.
The accuracy of the model is 80%, with precision of 79% and
recall of 72%.
We once attempted to train this model with k = 3 model
instances which resulted in hot keys in Google memcache [27].
We received a prompt ticket from Google SREs to immediately
fix this as it was causing broader in scope (outside of our
project) issues.
VI. REAL WORLD APPLICATIONS
A. Predicting Phishy URLs in Chat
One of the most common abuse vectors for our platform
is phishing user credentials. When malicious accounts manage
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Fig. 4: We compare several update strategies, varying the number of model instances k. Again, we observe results analogous to
Figure 3. Here, learning rate γ = 0.0001 which is 10 times smaller than the one we used in Figure 2.
Fig. 5: Comparing true and estimated weights for the logistic
model with known parameters (weights).
to befriend legitimate ones or some accounts get hacked, they
begin to send phishing url’s to users within their social circle.
Even if only a small fraction of users take the bait, the cycle
of abuse is perpetuated indefinitely. We rely on Google Safe
Browsing [22] and internally maintained lists of known phishy
URLs to prevent these kinds of attacks. However, the process
of discovering novel malicious URLs depends on customer ops
reports which is slow, manual and opportunistic.
We implemented a DDML logistic regression model for
predicting the likelihood of a URL being phishy. Our features
come from both the URL itself (different parts of the ULR,
such as domain, subdomain, host, path, query parameters),
as well as the page content. We consider features related to
character distribution, special characters (?,&, . . .), lengths,
language, particular keywords, etc. For content page features,
we include features related to major page component, such as
iframes, input boxes, password boxes, images, scripts, page
size, readability and many others.
For the model that we currently use in production, we
received 1,730,624,961 model updates. The number of weights
is 387. We use k = 20,  = log(32) and learning rate
γ = 0.001.
Performance of our model is shown in the table below.
ROC AUC 0.9702
PR AUC 0.7851
Accuracy 0.9263
Precision 0.1577
Recall 0.8922
F1 0.2681
Overall, our recall is very good, while precision remains
relatively low because of the inherent complexity of the
adversarial setting in which attackers constantly change their
approaches making it hard to detect new types of URLs that
have not been previously seen. Our online model allowed us
to increase discovery of new phishing urls by an orders of
magnitude since we launched it. We are exploring the addition
of features related to the way pages look, which is getting
closer to image analysis and, potentially, non-linear models in
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the future.
B. Ranking Application Based on User Text Input
Currently, we also have an application in production rank-
ing about 7,000 items, tagged with string qualifiers, based on
user text input. The model consists of uni-grams, bi-grams,
tri-grams and their selected crosses between user input and
tags ( 50,000 weights and 1MB in size). We have successfully
deployed smaller versions of this model globally and saw an
improvement in user engagement in single percentage points.
The hope is that, in the future, we will obtain even higher
gains with models of larger capacity.
VII. DISCUSSION
Having deployed DDML at scale at a large company with
millions of daily active clients, we realized how critical a
well-designed server-side architecture was to the client-side
learning process. Due to the symmetric nature of draws and
discards, with the number of reads equaling the number of
writes, there must be sufficient redundancy in place to scale
our serving infrastructure. k model instances offer, besides
increased privacy, an incredibly scalable and asynchronous
solution to client-server communication.
One can easily make an argument that replacing model
instances at random is “wasteful” from the model training
perspective. It is partially true. However, so is setting the wrong
learning rate, mismanaging the server-side batch size, etc. We
are never perfect in utilizing our data in the absolute sense even
before moving to a distributed ML setting. There, things only
become more complicated from a learning perspective and it
is not unreasonable to see additional performance sacrifices. If
your architecture can support only 10 writes per second, for
example, and your overall traffic is 100 write requests per sec-
ond, you will not be able to perfectly utilize all your available
data in a sequential updating scheme. Trade-offs must be made.
The focus should be not on what we are losing because we
must lose something, but what we are gaining in exchange.
By making a small sacrifice in performance by introducing
k instances, we gain scalability, ease of implementation, spam
detection, and additional privacy. The only question is whether
we are trading off these properties efficiently.
DDML framework can easily be extended to support neural
networks and any other models whose objective function
can be written as a sum of differentiable functions. Very
recent work of [35] may be useful in providing guidance for
parameter tuning in those cases. Extending it to decision trees
seems harder and further research into distributed optimization
of trees is needed.
A major struggle in the application of DP to practice [25],
[49] is the question of how to keep the overall per-user
privacy loss [41], [14] bounded over time. This is particularly
challenging in the local model as more data points are needed
to achieve the comparable level of utility in the local model
than in the trusted curator model [28]. Our approach mimics
the one taken by Apple’s deployment of DP [2], [49]: ensure
the privacy loss due to the collection of one piece of data
from one user is bounded, but allow multiple collections from
the same user over time. Formally, this corresponds to the
privacy loss growing as the number of items submitted, as per
composition theorems [29], [15].
We offer feature-level local differential privacy and, there-
fore, in a situation when features are correlated, the privacy
loss scales with the number of features. In principle, if one
would like to achieve model-level privacy, one needs to scale
the noise up according to the number of features included in
the model. Applications of differential privacy to very high-
dimensional data, particularly, in the local model, have not yet
been adopted in practice. In theoretical work, the distinction is
often mentioned, but the choice is left to industry practitioners.
We believe that in practice, feature-level privacy combined
with limited server-side model retention is sufficient to protect
the privacy of our clients against most realistic adversaries.
With respect to privacy guarantees, the main focus of this
work has been to ensure the strongest possible form of privacy
– pure differential privacy in the local model. We have also
discussed more realistic adversary models and the way that
DDML provides even better privacy guarantees against those.
We are optimistic that further improvements, both in utility and
in the tightness of privacy analyses are possible via switching
from Laplace to Gaussian noise in the DDML client-side
Algorithm 1, further precision of adversary modeling, and in
performing the analyses using the variant of Renyi Differential
Privacy [39] or Concentrated Differential Privacy [8]. The
optimism for the first claim stems from experience with other
differentially private applications and the very recent work
of [19]; for the second – from the similarities between DDML
and the shuffling strategy of [6] and privacy amplification by
sampling exploited by [32], [47], [1]; for the third – from
recent work in differentially private machine learning [1], [20],
[37], [50] that benefits from analyses using such relaxations.
We hypothesize that accuracy and privacy of DDML can also
be improved using hybrid approaches to privacy that combine
locally private data with public data or data obtained with
privacy in the non-local model, as proposed by [19] and [3].
In a sense, DDML can be viewed as a system, whose
particular components, such as the approach chosen to ensure
local privacy and the analysis under the chosen adversary
model can be varied depending on application and the desired
nuance of privacy guarantee.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
Client-side privacy-preserving machine learning is still in
its infancy and will continue to be an active and important
research area both in ML and privacy for the foreseeable
future. We believe that the most important contribution of this
work is a completely new server-side architecture with random
“draw and discards”, that offers unprecedented scalability with
no interrupts to the learning process, client-side and server-
side privacy guarantees and, finally, a simple, inexpensive and
practical approach to client-side machine learning.
Our focus on simpler, yet useful in practice, linear models
allowed us to experiment with client-side ML without having
to worry about convergence and other ML-related issues.
Instead, we have sufficient freedom to zoom in on privacy
considerations, build simple and scalable infrastructure and
leverage this technology to improve mobile features for mil-
lions of our users.
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